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U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

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INTERVIEW

OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CHIEF, COIG

MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

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JANUARY 28, 2008

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

This transcript was produced from tapes
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P R O C E E D I N G S

(b)(3), (b)(6) This is (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) the Multinational Corps-Iraq Historian.
Today is Monday, the 28th of January 2008 at
approximately 1930, and I am here at the al Far Palace
outside of Baghdad, Iraq, interviewing (b)(3), (b)(6)

This is the second interview with (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center
Chief, or COIC. The first interview was on the 20th
of August 2007.

(b)(3), (b)(6) if it is acceptable to
you, we did a release form then. We will just
consider it to still be in effect.

(b)(3), (b)(6) That's fine.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Just to validate the
tape, could you go ahead and introduce yourself with
your full name, if you would.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) Director of the MNCI COIC.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Great. I just wanted to
ask first off, looking back at that first interview,
since that time have there been any major changes that

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1 we should make mention of in terms of the way the COIC
2 is organized, its responsibilities or anything that
3 has been changed of a noteworthy fashion in terms of
4 your staffing?

5 [REDACTED] Again, we had no change
6 in mission or in organization. We did have some
7 people depart and some people to join us. Currently,
8 we are preparing to be relieved by the (Inaudible) the
9 18th Airborne Corps during that notable change.

10 [REDACTED]: When will you redeploy?

11 [REDACTED]: We've already begun
12 sending some persons back. We will continue that this
13 week, and then (Several words inaudible) on the 10th
14 of January and then again on the 12th -- or February,
15 and again on the 12th of February, and then I will
16 depart on the 14th of February.

17 [REDACTED]: One of the things when we
18 spoke last, we were looking at what at that time were
19 the downward trends, and you had expressed some
20 thoughts then about where those trends were going.

21 I know since then some of your team
22 briefed some of their usual Sunday briefs Monday. One

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1 of the things that came up for discussion is have you
2 reached that leveling out point, for instance?

3 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Yes. We have. As much
4 as we predicted, we have seen a leveling out, and that
5 is clearly reflected in our products, whether it is
6 the Effects Assessment Board or in our weekly ECTs.

7 We assessed back in September that the
8 enemy's main effort was going to be Mosul, and that
9 was not universally accepted at the time, but our
10 studies pointed in that direction, and since then it
11 has become quite clear that AQI has repositioned many
12 of their leadership and resources into the Mosul area,
13 either out of Diyala or Salahuddin, with many reports
14 suggesting they are getting aid out of Syria from
15 (Inaudible), to include the new Baath party.

16 We watched that very, very closely
17 throughout the autumn months, but it became
18 particularly clear to me in mid-November that the
19 enemy had a significant capacity for attacks where we
20 saw a dramatic rise in RPG attacks during the battle
21 handover between 4th Brigade of 1st Cav and 3d Army
22 Cavalry Regiment, specifically 3d Squadron, 3d ACR.

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1 We did a quick study of the area toward
2 the tail end of November of '07. By the 5th of
3 December after a pretty detailed analysis and
4 illustration (Inaudible), I came to the conclusion
5 that AQI's principal focus at the time was survival.
6 It suffered so much to our offensive operations in and
7 around Baghdad, especially in (Inaudible) Iraq that I
8 mentioned in the past, that he had retired into areas
9 in the northern half of the Diyala River Valley and up
10 into Mosul and to the areas west of Beji.

11 So I outlined to the Commanding General on
12 5 December that AQI was principally focused on
13 survival, with the main effort in Mosul, a supporting
14 effort between Beji and Kirkuk and another supporting
15 effort in the Samarra/Diyala River Valley area.

16 We gave it to them in detail in a sketch
17 map with a detailed breakout of the components for the
18 main effort in Mosul, the supporting effort, one in
19 the Beji-Kirkuk area, and the supporting effort number
20 two in the Samarra, the Diyala River Valley area.

21 Within the week, the C2 shop had our map
22 and began to digitize it, and on Friday afternoon of

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1 that same week we presented that assessment to the
2 Commanding Generals at the MNCI Commander's
3 Conference, and in effect that became Paragraph 1 for
4 the Operation Phantom Phoenix, the final offensive
5 operation of the Corps.

6 Since that time period, our assessment has
7 held quite true. What we assessed in the upper Diyala
8 River Valley and in areas south of Baqubah were
9 validated by operations conducted by Task Force 1.4a
10 and the Corps Reserve, 3d Squadron, 2nd Stryker
11 Cavalry Regiment operating outside of Moqtadiyah, and
12 again by the 5th Iraqi Army south of Baqubah down on
13 the continental side.

14 Massive support areas were found in both
15 those locations, and the enemy did not put up much of
16 a fight. But it showed its usual delaying tactics and
17 house borne IEDs or booby traps, (Inaudible) buried
18 IEDs, caches, etcetera.

19 In the meantime, the direct fire combat in
20 Mosul only increased, and of late I just showed the
21 CG one of our short analyses showing that the only
22 place in Iraq that we are seeing sustained RPG fire,

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1 small arms fire with IEDs are about three distinct
2 areas in Mosul, and all subsequent intelligence
3 reporting since early December confirms what we had
4 assessed back on the 5th of December.

5 So now Phantom Phoenix is well on its way.
6 The Corps is going to complete its duties here on an
7 offensive footing, much like we began, and we have a
8 good concept of operation for 18th Airborne Corps to
9 inherit.

10 So I think our ability to analyze the
11 enemy use of the IED has allowed us to define the
12 enemy in terms of location, capacity, will, perhaps
13 even intent, and that methodology allows us to see
14 enemy dispositions and correlate those assessments
15 with other reporting pretty rapidly, and it has
16 allowed me to give the Commander my appreciation of
17 the enemy on at least five distinct occasions that
18 have driven large Corps operations.

19 So there is a benefit to the COIC, I
20 think. It has allowed our team to focus on the
21 problem and view the enemy through the portal of the
22 IED, and to do so with economy and with speed, and to

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1 corroborate reporting accordingly.

2 I think it has allowed the Commander to
3 have situational awareness and to make rapid
4 assessments and to take decisions a little bit sooner
5 than he otherwise might be able to.

6 I think that is probably the most
7 significant set of trends since September.

8 I know you got a lot of products. We've
9 worked hard to give you everything that we have
10 digitally. So if you pay attention to our Effects
11 Assessment Board predictions, both our assessments and
12 predictions, you will see -- We have been pretty
13 consistent in our reporting and in our assessments,
14 and you will see we have been a couple of months ahead
15 of the conventional wisdom on things.

16 Further, you will note back in November
17 and December of '07, I rated the counter-IED fights as
18 green. I think, based on the objectives we set for
19 ourselves back in January of '07, we met those
20 criteria in November and again in December where we
21 saw 70 percent reduction in IED activity in all of the
22 key IED hot spots that we saw back in December of '06,

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1 Taji, Tarmiyah (Phonetic), Ramadi, Yusufiyah. All
2 those were reduced well below 70 percent of January
3 levels -- or December '06 levels by November of '07.

4 The VBIED cells in Baghdad suffered so
5 much attrition that they were effectively ineffective
6 by November. That was another criteria we set for
7 ourselves, the defeat of the Baghdad VBIED cells.

8 I think what we outlined for AO bedrock
9 (Phonetic) we talked about before in April and May
10 came to pass. The multiple operations that were
11 conducted in AO-Baghdad starting with the 13th MEU,
12 going out with the 6th Marine Regiment --

13 (b)(3), (b)(6): You said AO Baghdad. I
14 assume you meant --

15 (b)(3), (b)(6) AO Bedrock, excuse me --
16 and with 11 Cav and with 42 Stryker, multiple
17 operations in and out of Baghdad, and most recent 1st
18 of the 101st out of Samarra confirmed our template
19 and, interestingly enough, after 1st Brigade, 3d ID
20 finished our last offensive operation in there, it
21 coincided with the dramatic downturn in activity in
22 Baghdad, probably about two months ago.

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1 So we think that the assessment we gave
2 for AO-Bedrock proved accurate based upon all the
3 reporting from all the units that operate in there,
4 most currently 1st Brigade, 101st. In fact, the big
5 cache finds found in bunker complexes found by 1st
6 Brigade, 101st, a couple of weeks ago were a couple of
7 kilometers away from our named area of interest 004
8 along the SR Golden.

9 Since that cache was found, there has been
10 a precipitous dropoff in IED activity along
11 (Inaudible) south of Samarra, which confirmed again
12 our estimate.

13 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Where do you see us at
14 the end of Operation Phantom Phoenix?

15 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) I think we are observing
16 the remnants of AQI consolidating all of their
17 capability in and around Mosul, principally in Ninevah
18 Province to the west. There are probably pockets in
19 Samarra and Samarra East and in the areas north of
20 Jabour Peninsula on the north side of the Tigris
21 River. But, clearly, the enemy's main effort right
22 now is in Mosul.

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1 He is establishing support zones out in
2 the desert west of Beji, just like we had templated.
3 In fact, shortly after we templated support effort
4 number two outside of Beji, no sooner did an 18 from
5 the 5th Special Forces Group get into a 90 minute
6 firefight out there, and again 1st Brigade, 101st, has
7 been conducting patrols north and west of Beji
8 confirming support that we (Inaudible), which you had
9 on the map there.

10 So -- and since they have been out there
11 patrolling, attacks in Beji have gone down
12 dramatically. In fact, in addition to that the
13 brigade operating out of Camp Speicher has reported on
14 at least five separate occasions they think the enemy
15 is running out of ammunition.

16 So if we conduct an aggressive offensive
17 operation in Mosul, and I think we will, probably in
18 90 days time Mosul will be quiet and AQI will be
19 further disrupted, if not defeated. But I would
20 imagine there will be pockets in Samarra we will have
21 to deal with, out into Samarra East in the areas north
22 of the Diyala River Valley and the Tigris River line,

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1 probably well into the summer of next year. But as an
2 offensive striking capability, I think they will be
3 severely diminished. But they still have the capacity
4 for atrocity using suicide vests or vehicle IEDs, and
5 they will continue to do that in places like Baghdad
6 and Samarra, but of late their suicide borne vehicle
7 IEDs has gone down dramatically. I think that has a
8 lot to do with this precipitous dropoff of foreign
9 fighters in the country, suicide foreign fighters.

10 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) We have seen -- At least
11 to the casual observer, seems like we have seen an
12 increase in the house borne IED. In fact, this is a
13 relatively new term.

14 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) The house borne IED has
15 been used throughout the year, actually, if you look
16 back at the records. The house borne IED with a booby
17 trapped house indicates an AQI support zone. It means
18 we are in the support zone. We are clearing out those
19 areas that they have secured over years and months of
20 war.

21 It is where we find caches, large caches.
22 It is where we find their torture houses, their jails,

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1 their courtrooms, their dispensaries. When we are in
2 the right areas clearing out the AQI support zones, we
3 will find large buried IEDs used as parts of obstacle
4 networks to reinforce the terrain, and we will find
5 booby trap houses.

6 In fact, we did a special study on that a
7 couple of weeks ago that you should have in your
8 files. We have seen them south of Baghdad, within
9 Baghdad, especially in East Rasheed, and we saw scores
10 of them in Baqubah in the summer of '07.

11 Again, we have seen them in Diyala River
12 Valley areas up around Moqtadiyah, again in AQI
13 support zones. So as dangerous as they are, our
14 troops have been very, very good at identifying them
15 and clearing them before any injury has been done to
16 our soldiers, at probably at a rate of about 65-plus
17 percent found and clear rates for house borne IEDs.

18 We tend to find them after AQI has
19 withdrawn from an area. They are dangerous, but they
20 tend to be a positive sign that we are in the right
21 place, and we have forced the enemy to withdraw, and
22 he has put those out much like a delaying tactic to

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1 reduce our rate of pursuit.

2 (b)(3), (b)(6) Likewise, we have seen
3 more of what we are now calling person-borne IEDs,
4 PBIEDs. Is that different than -- Is there anything
5 different by definition of what we used to call S-
6 vests?

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) It's the same thing.
8 It's just that they are using them more frequently,
9 because, I believe, a few factors.

10 Our counter-mobility efforts around high
11 value targeted areas, whether they be markets or
12 governmental buildings, is such that it is hard for
13 them to infiltrate a car full of explosives into the
14 area, and the protection and fortification we have put
15 in place around high value targets precludes them from
16 bringing in large vehicle-borne IEDs.

17 In addition to that, I believe that what
18 the Coalition has done and what friends in the region
19 have done has dried up the ability of AQI to bring in
20 suicide foreign fighters.

21 We have seen a precipitous dropoff in the
22 number of foreign fighters coming into the country

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1 since September of '07. A lot of that has to do with
2 what the government of Saudi Arabia and Syria have
3 done. It has also had a lot to do with what Task
4 Force 1.4a has done in and around the Baghdad area as
5 a part of our effort to secure Baghdad.

6 Foreign fighter cells have been
7 significantly defeated in and around Baghdad. That,
8 coupled with our counter-mobility and destructive
9 efforts around key target areas has made the vehicle-
10 bornes or the suicide vehicle-borne IED almost
11 obsolete.

12 What we saw this last autumn into the
13 winter 07-'08 was a rise in person-borne IEDs or
14 suicide vest IEDs. We believe they do that, because
15 they can have better chances of infiltrating in
16 through the disruptive tactics we have around high
17 value targets, the counter-mobility and the
18 protection, where one person can sneak in with a
19 vest.

20 We have seen reports of children,
21 teenagers, mentally handicapped persons and women
22 being used to carry these devices, either wittingly or

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1 unwittingly, into markets or other areas in Baqubah,
2 in Baghdad. I think we have one incident where a man
3 carrying a suicide vest went into a funeral and
4 murdered a bunch of people in the Qoatah (Phonetic)
5 area of Baghdad.

6 We have seen the same things happen in
7 Baqubah. We believe these are acts of desperation
8 perpetrated by AQI, finding desperate individuals who
9 are willing to do this, and they have been
10 particularly lethal in some instances. You can get a
11 bunch of innocent civilians in one area and bring in
12 a person with a vest, a lot of military grade high
13 explosives covered with ball bearings that will cause
14 a lot of damage.

15 We have had American Army patrols hit in
16 Baqubah with these things. They are dangerous, but we
17 think they are less sophisticated weapons than, say,
18 suicide borne -- or vehicle borne suicide attempts.
19 They require less organization. It will require less
20 logistical support, but they can be lethal if the
21 right targets present themselves.

22 They are also harder to detect. We also

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1 have seen these vests used as uniform items on the
2 part of members of AQI who will wear these things into
3 battle and preclude capture or perhaps as a last act
4 of desperation. But our troops know how to do that.

5 In fact, we promulgated a study we
6 received from Task Force 1.4a on how to deal with that.
7 We have put that out in COIC briefings. In fact, we
8 have covered both of those items in detail and in
9 numerous COIC briefings to educate the chain of
10 command.

11 I think it is a desperate tactic that they
12 are using with the available people and resources they
13 have in reaction to our superior tactics.

14 [b 3, b 6] Let me take you to --

15 [b)(3), (b)(6)] By the way, civilian
16 casualties are a fraction of what they were. From the
17 time period of '06-'07 into this time period they are
18 a fraction, and our data charts can show you the exact
19 numbers.

20 [b)(3), (b)(6)]: Just for the listener's
21 benefit, [b)(3), (b)(6)] is referring to the Section
22 Historical Report that was collected for the COIC

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1 along with the other elements of the Multinational
2 Corps-Iraq staff that were recently turned in. So
3 that is the item referred to that will have much of
4 the data mentioned here.

5 I wanted to ask about the Shia side of
6 things and where you have seen that since we spoke
7 last, realizing that shortly after we spoke Sadr's
8 cease fire came into effect.

9 I am just looking for your sort of, as you
10 see the situation now with regard to Sadr, Shia
11 extremists and the [REDACTED] 14b, 14d with regard to
12 EFPs, explosively formed projectiles.

13 [REDACTED] b 3, b 6) The Sadr freeze order has
14 had a significant effect, especially with regard to
15 small arms attacks, rocket attacks and the number of
16 EFP attacks in and around the Baghdad area. South of
17 Baghdad, within certain quarters in Baghdad, there has
18 been a dramatic downturn in Shia violence against
19 Coalition forces.

20 Now what has persisted, though, are
21 extremists, JAM special groups that are not under the
22 control of Moqtada al-Sadr, fighting at the behest of

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1.4b, 1.4d

We have seen a decrease in attacks throughout the autumn months, but they have come back up of late in the month of January of '08, especially in the first week.

What we haven't seen is an increase in lethality, because we believe the tactics being used are not as good as they might be, or what we have seen in the past.

1.4b, 1.4d

We do believe that our surveillance operations along the border, denial of routes moving through Kut as a result of the Georgian Brigade's six checkpoints are foreign the enemy to redirect his activity either through Diyala or through southern regions out of Basra into Mujaf or Karbala and then up

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1 to Baghdad. That has been disrupted, but not wholly.

2 1st Cavalry Division and now 4th Infantry
3 Division are very effectively mitigating the effects
4 of enemy cells using EFPs, but the EFP is still
5 present on the battlefield. We have over 50 so far
6 this month, a dramatic increase over the last couple
7 of months. So that threat exists.

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12 1.4b, 1.4d
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18 In fact, you can go back to the records we
19 gave you, and you can see that briefing prepared by

20 (b)(3), (b)(6)

21 (b)(3), (b)(6)

22 I just want to make sure
for the listener that I have that full definition. I

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1 know I'm familiar with the

1.4b, 1.4d

1.4b, 1.4d

19 So all the indicators of potential
20 increase in EFP attacks, we are seeing right now. We
21 predicted that over a month ago, that we would see a
22 return -- and truth is we thought we would see it in

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1 March, and we are actually seeing it here in January.
2 But time will tell.

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4 1.4b, 1.4d
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6 (b)(3), (b)(6) For the long run, one of
7 the things we also witnessed since we spoke last was
8 on the 20th of December with the publication of Op Ord
9 08-01, laying out the road ahead for the next six
10 months and beyond, and drawing that down to the pre-
11 surge levels of troops, for instance, and then plus
12 they are talking again about the transition to Iraqi
13 Security Forces.

14
15 1.4b, 1.4d
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18 (b)(3), (b)(6) The Iraqi Security
19 Forces.

20 (b)(3), (b)(6) I'm sorry.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) I think the Iraqi
22 Security Forces are already doing that within their

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1 own areas of operation. I think the successes we have
2 had this year are due to many factors.

3 I think the principles of war apply to
4 this type of conflict, mass objective offense. I also
5 believe the principles of counter-insurgency apply,
6 specifically separating the insurgent from his base of
7 support and, in so doing, secure the population.

8 Of particular note, the Corps with 07-01
9 and again with 08-01 -- we have a Corps operational
10 level plan, and operational plan that is tied to the
11 reality of the tactical situation on the ground, and
12 linking it to our strategic outcomes as laid out by
13 national command authority to the MNFI Commanding
14 General's intent.

15 I believe that the Corps' concept of
16 operation at an operational level has linked our
17 tactical successes to our strategic outcomes. That
18 campaign plan, offensive campaign plan with an eye
19 toward securing the population has made all the
20 difference.

21 Now the reinforcements as a result of the
22 surge gave us the capacity, the means to execute our

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1 ways to achieve our ends. We focused on Baghdad as a
2 point of main effort. That was the essence of '07-01.
3 We secured the population of Baghdad with an eye
4 toward creating a time and space for political
5 accommodation in the country.

6 In so doing, we caused massive damage to
7 AQI. I believe we have also disrupted [14b, 14d]
8 [14b, 14d] in the Baghdad area through our very
9 aggressive security operations against that influence,
10 especially against JAM special group cells and, in
11 some cases, [14b, 14d]

12 Without question, the grassroots movements
13 in al Anbar, the awakening that we saw spread through
14 the area south of Baghdad and areas north of Baghdad
15 into Diyala, have had a tremendous impact on Sunni
16 resistance. But I think our efforts have separated AQI
17 from those Sunni nationalist groups.

18 The same with the freeze order from
19 Moqtada al-Sadr. Moqtada al-Sadr does have some, if
20 not significant, influence over many people in the
21 Shia portion of the Iraqi population.

22 Those popular grassroots political efforts

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1 have made a huge impact on the level of violence in
2 and around Baghdad, both with Sunni and with Shia. I
3 believe our field commanders in all of the MNDs and in
4 MNCI and MNFI saw these movements for what they were,
5 and we exploited them at a political level.

6 We exploited it with information
7 operations, public information. These have had a
8 combined effect on our principal enemy groups, AQI and
9 some other extremist Sunni groups and extremist Shia
10 groups.

11 No one thing, I believe, is decisive, but
12 I think our ability to see these opportunities and
13 exploit them with full spectrum capability has allowed
14 us to achieve great military successes in the realm of
15 security for the population.

16 We have achieved what we set out to
17 achieve. We have created time and space for political
18 accommodation. In terms of the counter-IED fight, as
19 Director of the COIC my focus was never on the IED.
20 It was on the enemy: Study the enemy; use the IED as
21 a way to begin to understand the enemy.

22 We never gave up our focus on finding

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1 material solutions to increase the protection of our
2 troops. As we told you earlier, we are in the middle
3 of the MRAP fielding. The MRAP is entirely
4 successful.

5 In fact, one thing we need to talk about:
6 We have had 21 events involving MRAPs, three accidents
7 and 18 attacks. Only one soldier has been killed. We
8 had a handful of wounded, but the vast majority of
9 soldiers have walked away. Many of these attacks, if
10 perpetrated against soldiers or Marines in Humvees,
11 would have resulted in multiple deaths in each
12 incident.

13 A sidebar: The MRAP has been a great
14 success, and it is only going to continue. The
15 fielding program is working along quite well.

16 Where will we be in the future? I think,
17 if we focus our combat power and all of our capability
18 up in Mosul and inflict upon AQI another resounding
19 defeat, and then follow through wherever the
20 opportunities may present themselves thereafter, we
21 will drive down lethal IED attacks significantly.

22 This will allow us to shift emphasis on

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1 the strategic threat coming out of 1.4b, 1.4c Hopefully,
2 political successes in and around Baghdad will help
3 identify some of these extremist Shia groups in the
4 meantime, and we will be able to focus our combat
5 power on those groups and further reduce their
6 attacks.

7 I really think the key to this fight now
8 is -- after defeat of AQI, is political accommodation.
9 We have seen throughout the AO that, when the people
10 turn against armed insurgent groups, IED attacks drop
11 off precipitously. Cache finds go up significantly.

12 In fact, this month will be our highest
13 month. I anticipate having 800 caches this month,
14 January of '08. And that is a result of significant
15 portions of the population being secure. Cache turn-
16 ins go up, find and clear rates.

17 In fact, our find and clear rate so far
18 this month is over 58 percent. In some MNDs they were
19 almost 75 percent less in West and Center. We had the
20 highest find and clear rate, sustained find and clear
21 rate this month (Inaudible).

22 So as we continue to have our military

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1 successes, as we continue to have political successes
2 at a grassroots level, all the key indicators of a
3 successful quote/unquote "counter-IED" campaign will
4 only further manifest themselves.

5 I think the IA is critical to this,
6 because once we secure an area and they move in for
7 the hold and build phase of the operation after we
8 clear, that's when we begin to see these dramatic
9 rises. So I think that dynamic will be in play in the
10 spring of '08.

11 We will probably see that play out in
12 Mosul. There will be a lot of hard fighting. The IED
13 attacks will go up. The RPG attacks go up. And as we
14 defeat the enemy, it will go down, as will our
15 casualties. The IA will move in numbers. The
16 population will begin to point out caches. Enemy
17 attacks will go down precipitously. Cache finds will
18 go through the roof. Find and clear rates will go
19 through the roof, and the area will become calm, and
20 the IA will consolidate the objective and hold so that
21 the building process can resume.

22 I think it is -- I think that will be the

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dynamic we will see play out in Mosul and probably in Samarra in the next year.

(b)(3), (b)(6): I wanted to ask a little bit about any changing relationships in terms of relations with the MNDs, knowing that since we talked last we have had the changeover of Multinational Division-Baghdad, of Multinational Division-North. Any changes in sort of the dynamics?

(b)(3), (b)(6) NO. I think we did a lot of preparatory work with each MND. We established Division support teams that were manned and paid for by JIEDDO.

In the case of Baghdad, now here in the West and, of course, up in North, it's been a seamless transition. We got a lot of those people in before the change, and we have not seen any drop in efficiency in terms of managing RFIs, implementing counter-IED, equipment fieldings, or exchanging lessons learned to the BCTs or in reporting methodologies. No drop in situational awareness.

So I think -- Of course, with Task Force 1.4a (Phonetic) on board, there's been no dropoff in

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1 their use. I think the change from 25th ID to 1st
2 Armored Division has not resulted in any dropoff in
3 efficiency at all.

4 In fact, we probably have more requests
5 for information than ever. We've just gone over 748
6 requests for information, 40 of which are being worked
7 right now. These are levels that we haven't had in
8 the past.

9 So that system of division support teams,
10 MNCI COIC, the JIATF COIC, meeting one of the CG's key
11 intents for the COIC system was the answer. The
12 request for information from battalions or brigades or
13 squadrons and regiments and the divisions has been
14 fully realized.

15 So I haven't seen any downturn at all with
16 the changes.

17 (b)(3), (b)(6) What is the (Inaudible)
18 with the 18th Airborne Corps, knowing that this is a
19 unique organization.

20 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. This is
21 nontraditional. They stated they want to maintain the
22 capability. They are trying to figure out how they

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1 want to incorporate it into their future ops planning
2 cell.

3 I and my time are going to give them
4 everything we have terms of SOP, battle rhythm, key
5 products, reporting methodologies, how we oversee
6 material solutions, how we oversee requests for
7 information.

8 We are going to give them everything we
9 have learned, and I know full well they will take that
10 and fit it into their way of doing business; and it
11 will probably take them some weeks, if not a couple of
12 months, to figure out exactly how they want to do it.
13 But I'm sure they will benefit by our lessons and
14 adapt it to their way of doing business, given the
15 situation out on the battlefield and their Commander's
16 intent.

17 They will get everything we have learned
18 and produced, and I'm sure they will adapt around it.

19 (b)(3), (b)(6) You had mentioned Task
20 Force 1.4a a few minutes ago. Any change to the way
21 they --

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) No, I think Task Force

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1 [1.4a] is -- So they've got a few more air frames in,
2 but I think with the 25th ID developed and standard
3 operating procedures have been carried on by not only
4 1st Armored Division but by all the MNDs that use the
5 capabilities of [1.4a] and it's been entirely
6 successful. We continue to monitor their use on a
7 daily basis.

8 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] Is there anything else I
9 haven't asked you about that's happened?

10 [(b)(3), (b)(6)] I think we have been j--
11 I look back at the intent the Commanding General gave
12 me over 16 months ago, and I think we have met that
13 intent.

14 We came here with a handful of people, no
15 conception of operation, no facility. In the meantime
16 we've built a facility, brought scores of people on
17 board, trained them, developed our standard operating
18 procedures, our products, and integrated ourselves
19 into the staff and the fight, and I think we have done
20 everything the Commanding General has asked us to do.

21 If anything else, we have answered over
22 700 requests for information with high quality

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1 products, much more than I thought we would ever get
2 done. We helped with the Chief of Staff and Major
3 General Simmons, the DCG of the Corps.

4 We have put together a series of meetings
5 and a battle rhythm and a set of procedures that allow
6 us to focus material solutions for the counter-IED
7 fight, in accordance with the reality of the
8 battlefield and the Commander's intent.

9 I think we got a very, very good process.
10 I think our material situation right now in theater
11 has never been better, and I think our ability to give
12 the Commanding General SA, or situational awareness,
13 has been proven over and over again. We take great
14 pride in giving the CG very timely and very accurate
15 reads on the battlefield with unequivocal assessments.

16 We have also given the CG numerous
17 recommendations for offensive operations, all within
18 his intent, and I think we have done what he has asked
19 us to do. If not, at least we have worked hard trying
20 to do it.

21 I'm very proud of what these people have
22 done, all of them very, very young, and they have all

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1 adapted, both civilians, Navy, Marines, Air Force,
2 Army, British Army, and all who have been involved in
3 this effort.

4 So it's been a great opportunity to do our
5 bit to help win this thing. So --

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) Great. Thanks very much.
7 That concludes this interview.

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